CISI CFC — CISI Combating Financial Crime Quick Review

Quick-review quick review for the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment CISI Combating Financial Crime exam code CISI CFC.

CISI CFC exam identity and review purpose

This quick review is for candidates preparing for the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment exam CISI Combating Financial Crime, exam code CISI CFC.

Use it as a fast consolidation tool before moving into topic drills, mock exams, and detailed explanations. It is independent companion practice support and is not affiliated with the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment.

Best use: review one section, then answer original practice questions on that topic. Do not rely on memorised buzzwords only; the exam commonly tests whether you can choose the most appropriate control, escalation, or risk-based action in a scenario.

High-yield financial crime map

AreaCore ideaWhat exam questions often test
Money launderingCriminal property is disguised so it appears legitimateStages, suspicion, CDD, reporting, tipping-off, monitoring
Terrorist financingFunds are used to support terrorism; source may be legal or illegalDifference from money laundering, small-value patterns, sanctions links
Proliferation financeFinancing movement or development of weapons of mass destructionTrade finance red flags, sanctions, dual-use goods, indirect networks
SanctionsLegal restrictions on dealing with named persons, entities, sectors, goods, or jurisdictionsScreening, ownership/control, false positives, asset freezes, escalation
Bribery and corruptionImproper advantage offered, requested, given, or receivedGifts, hospitality, agents, facilitation payments, public officials
FraudDeception or dishonest conduct for gain or to cause lossIdentity theft, internal fraud, cyber fraud, investment scams
Tax evasion facilitationHelping another person evade taxEvasion vs avoidance, staff/agent involvement, prevention controls
Market abuseMisuse of securities markets or confidential informationInsider dealing, manipulation, spoofing, front-running, information barriers
Governance and controlsFirm-wide systems to prevent, detect, report, and remediate crimeRisk-based approach, three lines of defence, MLRO/nominated officer, records

The core decision model: risk-based control

Most financial crime questions reduce to a simple chain:

  1. Identify the parties and activity
    Who is involved? Customer, beneficial owner, controller, agent, payee, issuer, employee, counterparty, intermediary?

  2. Assess inherent risk
    Consider customer type, geography, product, delivery channel, transaction behaviour, and sanctions exposure.

  3. Apply proportionate controls
    Standard due diligence for normal risk; enhanced due diligence for higher risk; simplified measures only where permitted and justified.

  4. Monitor and refresh
    Risk changes after onboarding. Monitoring must detect unusual behaviour, not just collect documents.

  5. Escalate suspicion or legal restriction
    Suspicion, sanctions matches, bribery concerns, fraud alerts, or market abuse indicators must be escalated through the correct internal process.

  6. Record the rationale
    A good decision is weak if the firm cannot evidence why it made it.

    flowchart TD
	    A[Customer, transaction, or employee activity] --> B[Identify parties and purpose]
	    B --> C[Assess risk factors]
	    C --> D{Risk acceptable?}
	    D -- No --> E[Decline, restrict, exit, or escalate]
	    D -- Yes --> F[Apply CDD / EDD / screening]
	    F --> G[Monitor activity]
	    G --> H{Unusual, suspicious, or prohibited?}
	    H -- No --> I[Continue with periodic review]
	    H -- Yes --> J[Internal escalation]
	    J --> K[SAR/STR, sanctions escalation, fraud response, or other action]
	    K --> L[Record decision and avoid tipping-off]

Money laundering essentials

The three classic stages

StageMeaningTypical examplesCommon exam trap
PlacementIntroducing criminal proceeds into the financial systemCash deposits, prepaid products, money service businesses, purchase of assetsPlacement is not always physical cash
LayeringCreating distance between funds and criminal originMultiple transfers, offshore entities, complex trades, crypto movements, securities transactionsLayering can occur through normal-looking investment activity
IntegrationReintroducing funds as apparently legitimate wealthProperty purchases, business income, investment returns, loansIntegration does not mean the risk is over

Key concepts to know

  • Predicate offence: the underlying crime that generated the proceeds.
  • Criminal property: property representing benefit from criminal conduct.
  • Suspicion: more than a vague feeling, less than proof. The exact legal threshold depends on jurisdiction, but exam scenarios usually test whether a reasonable person should escalate.
  • Concealment: hiding source, ownership, location, movement, or control of criminal property.
  • Acquisition/use/possession: money laundering risk can arise from holding or using criminal property, not just moving it.

Money laundering red flags

Red flagWhy it matters
Customer cannot explain source of funds or purposeMay indicate criminal proceeds or front activity
Complex structure with no clear commercial purposeMay hide beneficial ownership or control
Rapid movement in and out of accountsLayering risk
Third-party payments inconsistent with profilePossible mule, nominee, fraud, or sanctions evasion
Reluctance to provide documentsPossible concealment
Transactions just below reporting or control thresholdsStructuring/smurfing risk
Unusual use of securities or insurance productsPotential laundering through investment products
High-risk jurisdiction links without rationaleIncreased exposure to corruption, sanctions, or weak controls

Terrorist financing and proliferation finance

Money laundering vs terrorist financing

PointMoney launderingTerrorist financing
Source of fundsUsually criminal proceedsMay be legal, illegal, or mixed
ObjectiveMake criminal property appear legitimateFund terrorist activity or organisations
Transaction sizeCan be large or complexCan be small, low-value, repeated
TimingOften after predicate offenceOften before harmful act
Key riskConceal origin of fundsConceal destination or purpose of funds

Terrorist financing indicators

  • Small but repeated transfers to high-risk locations.
  • Use of charities or non-profit organisations without transparent purpose.
  • Funds moved through family, community, or informal value transfer networks.
  • Customers with unclear travel, cash withdrawal, or remittance patterns.
  • Links to sanctioned persons, extremist organisations, or conflict zones.
  • Sudden change in account use inconsistent with customer profile.

Proliferation finance indicators

  • Trade involving dual-use goods or controlled technology.
  • Unusual shipping routes, trans-shipment points, or vague goods descriptions.
  • Shell companies in trade chains.
  • Inconsistent documentation: invoices, bills of lading, end-user certificates.
  • Counterparties linked to sanctioned jurisdictions, military end-users, or front companies.
  • Overly complex payment paths inconsistent with the trade.

Customer due diligence: CDD, EDD, SDD

CDD purpose

Customer due diligence is not just document collection. It is the process of understanding:

  • Who the customer is.
  • Who ultimately owns or controls the customer.
  • Why the customer wants the product or service.
  • How the relationship is expected to operate.
  • Whether the activity is consistent with the customer’s risk profile.

Identification vs verification

TermMeaningExample
IdentificationObtain identity informationName, date of birth, address, company details
VerificationConfirm identity using reliable evidencePassport, registry extract, independent electronic check
Beneficial ownership identificationFind the natural persons who ultimately own or controlShareholders, controllers, trustees, protectors
Purpose and intended natureUnderstand why the relationship existsInvestment objective, expected transactions, source of funds

Trap: A company registry document may identify the legal entity, but it may not fully identify the natural persons who ultimately own or control it.

CDD timing and trigger points

CDD is commonly required or refreshed when:

  • Establishing a business relationship.
  • Carrying out certain occasional transactions where rules require it.
  • There is suspicion of financial crime.
  • Existing documents or information are unreliable or outdated.
  • Customer activity changes significantly.
  • There is a material change in ownership, control, geography, product use, or risk profile.

Simplified, standard, and enhanced due diligence

LevelWhen appropriateKey point
Simplified due diligenceLower-risk situations where allowedNot “no due diligence”; still need a basis for lower risk
Standard CDDNormal risk relationshipsIdentify, verify, understand purpose, screen, monitor
Enhanced due diligenceHigher-risk customers, products, geographies, or behavioursMore evidence, senior approval where required, deeper source checks, closer monitoring

Beneficial ownership and control

What to remember

Beneficial ownership is about ultimate natural person ownership or control. The exam may test scenarios where legal ownership differs from real control.

StructureWhat to look for
CompanyShareholders, voting rights, control through agreements, directors, nominees
TrustSettlor, trustees, beneficiaries, protectors, persons exercising ultimate control
PartnershipPartners, managing partners, controllers
Fund or investment vehicleManager, general partner, investors where relevant, control rights
Foundation or charityControllers, trustees, donors, beneficiaries, purpose

Common traps

  • A nominee shareholder may not be the true beneficial owner.
  • Control can exist without majority ownership.
  • A complex structure is not automatically suspicious, but it must have a plausible commercial purpose.
  • Listed or regulated status may reduce some risks, but it does not eliminate the need to understand the relationship.
  • If ownership cannot be understood, the firm may need to decline or exit, depending on policy and law.

Source of funds vs source of wealth

ConceptQuestion answeredExample evidence
Source of fundsWhere did this specific money come from?Bank statement, sale contract, payslip, dividend statement
Source of wealthHow did the customer build overall wealth?Business ownership, inheritance, career earnings, investment history

Exam trap: A customer saying “business income” may help explain source of wealth, but it may not prove the source of funds for a specific transaction.

Politically exposed persons: PEPs

PEP risk logic

A politically exposed person is not automatically criminal. The risk is that a person with prominent public functions, or their family/close associates, may have access to public funds, influence, procurement, licensing, or corrupt networks.

High-yield PEP review

IssueCorrect exam logic
PEP identifiedApply required enhanced measures; do not assume automatic rejection
Family member or close associateTreat as connected risk; understand relationship and funds
Domestic vs foreign vs international organisation PEPRisk level may differ, but PEP controls still matter where required
Former PEPRisk may reduce over time, but does not disappear automatically
Senior management approvalOften required for higher-risk PEP relationships under firm policy/rules
Source of wealth and fundsUsually central to PEP EDD

PEP red flags

  • Wealth inconsistent with known public salary or career history.
  • Use of relatives, associates, companies, or trusts.
  • Links to procurement, extractive industries, defence, infrastructure, or state-owned enterprises.
  • Unexplained payments from government contractors or politically connected entities.
  • Pressure to bypass normal onboarding or monitoring.

Sanctions screening and asset-freezing

What sanctions controls cover

Sanctions controls may apply to:

  • Customers and prospective customers.
  • Beneficial owners and controllers.
  • Directors, trustees, signatories, and authorised persons.
  • Payees, beneficiaries, remitters, intermediaries, and counterparties.
  • Issuers, securities, vessels, goods, sectors, or jurisdictions.
  • Ownership and control by sanctioned persons or entities.

Sanctions screening decision table

ResultMeaningCorrect response
No apparent matchNo obvious sanctions issueContinue normal risk process
False positiveSimilar name/details but not the listed personRecord rationale and continue if appropriate
Possible matchInsufficient information to clearEscalate; do not ignore
True matchListed person/entity or owned/controlled partyFreeze/restrict as required, escalate, report where required
Circumvention concernActivity designed to evade sanctionsEscalate as suspicious/prohibited activity

Common sanctions traps

  • Screening only the customer and ignoring beneficial owners.
  • Treating a name mismatch as clearance without checking date of birth, address, nationality, identifiers, ownership, or control.
  • Assuming sanctions apply only to countries, not individuals, entities, sectors, goods, or services.
  • Continuing a transaction while a possible true match is unresolved.
  • Missing indirect ownership or control through layered entities.
  • Failing to rescreen when lists change.

Suspicion, escalation, SARs and STRs

Internal escalation

When staff identify suspicious activity, they normally escalate internally to the MLRO, nominated officer, financial crime team, or equivalent role under the firm’s procedures.

The staff member does not need to prove a crime. The key issue is whether the facts create suspicion or reasonable grounds for concern.

SAR/STR quality

A strong suspicious activity report or suspicious transaction report usually explains:

ElementQuestion
WhoCustomer, beneficial owner, counterparties, employees involved
WhatTransactions, products, behaviours, documents
WhenDates, sequence, timing, urgency
WhereCountries, accounts, branches, channels
Why suspiciousRed flags and inconsistency with expected profile
HowMethods used: layering, structuring, third parties, false documents
EvidenceDocuments, alerts, communications, transaction records

Tipping-off and confidentiality

Do not disclose to the customer or third party that a report has been made, is being considered, or that an investigation may occur if that could prejudice an investigation.

Exam trap: Asking a customer routine clarification questions may be appropriate, but telling them “your transaction has been reported as suspicious” is a serious problem.

Bribery and corruption

Core bribery concepts

Bribery involves offering, promising, giving, requesting, agreeing to receive, or accepting an advantage intended to induce or reward improper performance.

It can involve:

  • Public officials.
  • Private-sector employees.
  • Agents and intermediaries.
  • Gifts, hospitality, travel, entertainment, donations, sponsorship, employment offers, or facilitation payments.
  • Direct or indirect benefits.

Bribery risk indicators

IndicatorWhy it matters
Unusual commission or success feeMay be disguised bribe
Agent refuses anti-bribery clausesWeak control and possible intent
Payments to offshore account unrelated to workConcealment risk
“Urgent” payment to secure licence/permitPublic official bribery risk
Excessive hospitality before contract awardImproper influence risk
Charitable donation linked to decision-makerPossible indirect benefit
Consultant with no clear service providedSham intermediary risk

Gifts and hospitality decision rules

QuestionIf answer is concerning
Is it proportionate and reasonable?Escalate or decline
Is there a legitimate business purpose?If no, high bribery risk
Is it during a tender, negotiation, or approval?Higher risk
Could it influence a decision?Higher risk
Is it transparent and recorded?If no, higher risk
Is a public official involved?Apply stricter scrutiny

Trap: Hospitality is not automatically a bribe, but lavish, secret, repeated, or decision-linked hospitality is a major red flag.

Fraud and cyber-enabled financial crime

Common fraud types

Fraud typeDescriptionControl focus
Identity fraudFalse or stolen identity used to access servicesVerification, biometric/electronic checks, document validation
Account takeoverCriminal gains control of legitimate accountStrong authentication, behavioural monitoring
Authorised push payment fraudVictim is tricked into sending fundsConfirmation, warnings, transaction monitoring
Internal fraudEmployee abuses access or positionSegregation of duties, access controls, surveillance
Investment fraudFalse or misleading investment opportunityDue diligence, suspicious promotion monitoring
Boiler room scamHigh-pressure sale of worthless or unsuitable investmentsClient education, transaction controls
Invoice fraudPayment instructions are manipulatedCallback controls, payee verification
Cyber fraudPhishing, malware, credential theftCyber controls, incident response, staff training

Fraud exam traps

  • Fraud may create money laundering risk because fraud proceeds become criminal property.
  • A genuine customer can still be a fraud victim or fraudster.
  • Cyber indicators are financial crime indicators when they affect funds, identity, transactions, or market integrity.
  • Internal fraud requires escalation outside the normal line manager if the manager may be involved.

Key concepts

ConductMeaningTypical indicator
Insider dealingTrading using inside informationTrade before announcement
Unlawful disclosureImproperly sharing inside informationTip to friend, client, or colleague
Market manipulationCreating false or misleading market signalsWash trades, matched orders, ramping
Spoofing/layeringPlacing orders to mislead, then cancellingLarge non-genuine orders away from market
Front-runningTrading ahead of client order using knowledge of itEmployee/client order timing pattern
Pump-and-dumpPromoting price then sellingHype followed by insider selling

Control tools

  • Information barriers.
  • Restricted and watch lists.
  • Personal account dealing controls.
  • Order and trade surveillance.
  • Communication monitoring.
  • Escalation of suspicious orders and transactions.
  • Conflicts of interest management.
  • Staff training on inside information.

Trap: Market abuse does not always require a completed profit. Attempted manipulation or misuse of information can still be serious.

Tax evasion facilitation

Avoidance vs evasion

ConceptMeaningExam logic
Tax planning/avoidanceArranging affairs within the law, though sometimes aggressiveNot automatically criminal
Tax evasionDishonestly evading taxCriminal conduct risk
FacilitationHelping another person evade taxFirm/staff/agent control issue

Red flags

  • Customer requests false invoices or misleading descriptions.
  • Payments routed to hide beneficial ownership.
  • Assets held in names of relatives, nominees, or shell companies without rationale.
  • Employee or agent suggests hiding income or assets.
  • Customer asks for documents to misrepresent residence, income, or ownership.
  • Structures have no commercial purpose other than concealment.

Prevention controls

  • Clear policies on tax evasion facilitation.
  • Staff training on red flags.
  • Due diligence on agents and intermediaries.
  • Approval controls for higher-risk structures.
  • Monitoring and escalation.
  • Evidence of reasonable decision-making.

Governance: roles and responsibilities

Three lines of defence

LineMain responsibilityExamples
First lineOwn and manage risk in the businessOnboarding, customer contact, transaction review, escalation
Second lineSet policy, advise, monitor, challengeCompliance, financial crime team, sanctions team, MLRO function
Third lineIndependent assuranceInternal audit, control testing, governance reviews

Senior management and board responsibilities

Senior leadership must ensure the firm has proportionate systems and controls. This includes:

  • Risk appetite.
  • Policies and procedures.
  • Adequate resourcing.
  • Training.
  • Reporting and management information.
  • Independent review.
  • Culture and tone from the top.
  • Remediation of weaknesses.

Trap: Outsourcing a process does not outsource responsibility. The firm remains accountable for ensuring controls are effective.

Firm-wide risk assessment

A firm-wide financial crime risk assessment usually considers:

Risk factorExamples
Customer riskPEPs, cash-intensive businesses, complex structures, charities, MSBs
Geographic riskHigh corruption, sanctions exposure, weak AML controls, conflict zones
Product riskPrivate banking, trade finance, correspondent banking, crypto exposure, prepaid products
Delivery channel riskNon-face-to-face onboarding, intermediaries, digital channels
Transaction riskLarge, complex, rapid, unusual, cross-border, third-party activity
Employee/agent riskSales incentives, remote agents, weak supervision

Inherent, control, and residual risk

Risk typeMeaning
Inherent riskRisk before controls
Control effectivenessHow well policies, systems, monitoring, training, and governance reduce risk
Residual riskRisk remaining after controls

Exam trap: A high-risk customer is not automatically unacceptable. The question is whether risk can be understood, mitigated, monitored, and accepted within policy and law.

Transaction monitoring

What monitoring should detect

  • Activity inconsistent with known customer profile.
  • Unusual size, frequency, route, or purpose.
  • Rapid movement of funds.
  • Transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions.
  • Third-party payments without rationale.
  • Structuring or threshold avoidance.
  • Sanctions or PEP changes.
  • Unusual securities trading patterns.
  • Fraud or cyber-related behaviour.

Alert handling

StepGood practice
TriageCheck whether alert is explainable using known facts
InvestigationGather transaction history, customer profile, documents, communications
DecisionClose with rationale, escalate, restrict, or report
DocumentationRecord evidence and reasoning
FeedbackTune scenarios, update risk profile, improve controls

Trap: Closing alerts because “the customer is long-standing” is weak. Long-standing customers can become suspicious if behaviour changes.

Recordkeeping and evidence

Records should allow the firm and reviewers to understand what happened, what was considered, and why a decision was made.

Record typeWhy it matters
CDD and verification evidenceShows identity and ownership checks
Risk assessmentsShows risk-based rationale
Screening resultsShows sanctions/PEP/adverse media handling
Monitoring alertsShows investigation and closure reasoning
Internal reportsShows escalation
SAR/STR recordsShows reporting decisions
Training recordsShows staff awareness
Governance minutes and MIShows oversight
Remediation plansShows weaknesses were addressed

Controls: preventive, detective, corrective

Control typePurposeExamples
PreventiveStop risk before it occursCDD, EDD, approval limits, sanctions screening, segregation of duties
DetectiveIdentify problemsTransaction monitoring, trade surveillance, exception reports, audits
CorrectiveFix issues and reduce recurrenceSAR/STR filing, account restriction, exit, discipline, remediation, retraining

Exam tip: If the question asks what should happen before onboarding, choose preventive controls. If it asks about unusual activity after onboarding, choose monitoring, investigation, and escalation.

Common exam traps and best-answer rules

TrapBetter answer logic
“No proof, so no report”Suspicion does not require proof
“PEPs must always be rejected”PEPs require enhanced risk management, not automatic rejection
“CDD is complete once documents are collected”CDD includes understanding ownership, purpose, and ongoing monitoring
“Sanctions screening is only at onboarding”Rescreening and transaction screening may be needed
“A false positive can be ignored”It must be resolved and documented
“Small terrorist financing transactions are too minor”TF may involve low values
“Complex structure equals money laundering”Complexity is a risk indicator; assess purpose and control
“Gifts are acceptable if local custom permits them”Local custom does not remove bribery risk
“The customer is regulated, so no risk exists”Risk may be lower, not zero
“Only compliance owns financial crime risk”First line owns risk; compliance advises and monitors
“If outsourced, the vendor is responsible”The firm remains responsible for oversight
“Source of funds and source of wealth are the same”They answer different questions
“Tipping-off only means telling the customer a SAR was filed”Any disclosure that prejudices an investigation may be problematic
“Tax avoidance and tax evasion are identical”Evasion is dishonest/criminal; avoidance may be legal but still risky
“Market abuse only matters if profit is made”Attempts and misleading signals can still be serious

Rapid scenario review

Scenario 1: unexplained third-party payment

A new investment client receives a large payment from an unrelated third party and asks for it to be invested immediately.

Best response:

  • Do not process automatically.
  • Ask for commercial rationale and source of funds evidence.
  • Consider third-party payment, layering, and fraud risk.
  • Escalate if explanation is weak or suspicious.
  • Document the decision.

Scenario 2: possible sanctions name match

A customer name partially matches a sanctions list, but the date of birth is missing from the customer file.

Best response:

  • Treat as a possible match.
  • Obtain or verify additional identifiers if appropriate.
  • Escalate according to sanctions procedures.
  • Do not assume false positive without evidence.

Scenario 3: PEP with legitimate wealth

A PEP provides credible evidence of wealth from a long-standing business.

Best response:

  • Do not automatically reject.
  • Apply required EDD.
  • Verify source of wealth and source of funds.
  • Obtain approvals where required.
  • Apply ongoing monitoring.

Scenario 4: suspicious client communication

A client says, “Please do not ask questions about where the money came from; just split it into smaller transfers.”

Best response:

  • Recognise structuring and concealment risk.
  • Escalate internally.
  • Avoid tipping-off.
  • Do not assist the activity while concerns are unresolved.

Scenario 5: agent requests unusual commission

An overseas consultant asks for a success fee paid to an offshore account after helping obtain a government contract.

Best response:

  • Treat as bribery/corruption risk.
  • Perform enhanced due diligence on the agent.
  • Review contract, services, payment rationale, and approvals.
  • Escalate if unexplained or policy-breaching.

Last-week review priorities

Use this checklist before mock exams:

  • Can you explain placement, layering, and integration with examples?
  • Can you distinguish money laundering from terrorist financing?
  • Can you identify beneficial ownership and control risks?
  • Can you separate source of funds from source of wealth?
  • Can you choose between CDD, EDD, SDD, monitoring, escalation, and exit?
  • Can you resolve sanctions false positives vs possible true matches?
  • Can you identify tipping-off risk?
  • Can you spot bribery through gifts, agents, donations, or facilitation payments?
  • Can you recognise fraud, cyber fraud, and market abuse indicators?
  • Can you explain the roles of first line, second line, third line, MLRO/nominated officer, and senior management?
  • Can you justify decisions using a risk-based approach?

How to connect this review to practice

After reviewing each section, use a question bank in this order:

  1. Topic drills for weak areas: CDD, sanctions, bribery, SAR/STR, fraud, market abuse.
  2. Mixed sets to practise switching between financial crime topics.
  3. Mock exams to build timing and best-answer discipline.
  4. Detailed explanations to understand why attractive wrong answers are wrong.

Your next step: choose one high-yield topic from this page, complete a short set of original practice questions, then review every explanation before moving to the next topic.

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